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Abstract: 1 
The pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries have been confronted both by 2 
dwindling product pipelines and rapid developments in life sciences, thus demanding a 3 
strategic rethinking of conventional R&D. Despite offering both industries a solution to 4 
the pipeline problem, the life sciences have also brought new and complex regulatory 5 
challenges for multi-national firms. In this paper, we comment on these industries’ 6 
response to the life science trajectory in the context of maturing conventional small-7 
molecule product pipelines and routes to market. The challenges of managing transition 8 
from maturity to a new high-value added innovation model are addressed.  Further, we 9 
argue that regulation has played a critical role in shaping the innovation systems of both 10 
industries and, as such, we reflect on potentially useful changes to the current regulatory 11 
system.  12 
13 
 3 
Introduction to the new life science industries 14 
The new molecular life sciences have transformed a range of R&D-driven industries over 15 
the past couple of decades, particularly in pharmaceuticals and agriculture. Both 16 
industries are susceptible to “technological shocks” as new scientific knowledge and 17 
path-breaking technologies broaden the spectrum of options for R&D and strategic 18 
management. The complexity of the life sciences, and the different implications of 19 
biotechnology and genomics for various parts of the R&D process, have created what are 20 
now highly distributed innovation systems and company networks in both sectors [1-3].  21 
Firm strategy is shaped by robust, though ever-changing, multi-layered and sometimes 22 
cumbersome regulatory systems that are located outside the core innovation system, but 23 
which continue to influence innovation at all times [4].  The success of multi-national 24 
companies depends on a continuous flow of new, innovative products with clear routes to 25 
market and established, well-understood value systems. In pharmaceuticals, these have 26 
traditionally been small-molecule blockbuster products in core therapeutic franchises. 27 
Similarly, until the early 1990s, the dominant innovation model in the agricultural sector 28 
was global commodity crops. In both industries, new technologies, such as high-29 
throughput screening and combinatorial chemistry, were embraced enthusiastically and 30 
brought product and process advances in the identification, validation and formulation of 31 
new chemicals.  32 
Rapid developments in the life sciences in the late 1980s and early 1990s brought 33 
new opportunities and challenges for both industries, and continue to do so today. Just as 34 
conventional product pipelines began to reach maturity, the new life sciences offered 35 
hope of developing radically different types of product and markets to displace prior 36 
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innovation strategies. For the pharmaceutical industry, recombinant proteins in the 1980s, 37 
monoclonal antibodies in the 1990s, and more recently stem cells, emerged as potential 38 
alternatives to blockbuster small molecule drugs. Similarly,  in the late 1980s GM crops 39 
presented the agro-chemical industry with a radically new product portfolio that was 40 
disruptive to its prevailing R&D strategy.   However, the life sciences also brought new 41 
competition for incumbent firms as smaller biotechnology companies with unique 42 
knowledge and expertise emerged. The path-breaking nature of the new technologies and 43 
products, many with unknown risk profiles and without established routes to market, 44 
engender new regulatory hurdles that increase the cost of R&D and generate uncertainty. 45 
Our aim is to explore the evolution of the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology 46 
industries in the context of emerging life science innovation and new regulatory systems, 47 
and suggest key lessons for future governance.  We use the term agro-biotechnology in 48 
this article to refer specifically to those agrochemical companies that linked with seed 49 
companies to produce GM crops.  We highlight the opportunities and challenges of 50 
managing transition from maturity to a new high-value-added innovation model subject 51 
to high regulatory hurdles and hope to spur a broader discussion about the systemic 52 
aspects of R&D-driven industries and the role of regulation in shaping innovation. 53 
 54 
From maturity to value-added innovation: challenges and opportunities 55 
Developments in the life sciences have reshaped the pharmaceutical and agro-56 
biotechnological industries.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, the largest multinational 57 
chemical firms had a relatively integrated and complementary R&D strategy. Indeed, 58 
some had both health and agriculture divisions. This period of innovative activity was 59 
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characterised by a series of mergers and acquisitions as multinationals sought “buy-in” to 60 
new technology platforms [5].  61 
However, this “combination strategy” ended around the late 1990s. The two 62 
sectors separated their capabilities and pursued autonomous strategies of innovation 63 
through both merger and acquisition (M&A ) activities and strategic alliances. It became 64 
clear to senior managers that synergy between agriculture and pharmaceuticals at the 65 
discovery-level was profitable only when both sectors were primarily interested in the 66 
source of chemical novelty, but not in the “gene” area [5,6]. Functional genomics could 67 
have benefited both sectors in their search for novel and commercially viable chemicals, 68 
but disparities in profit margins [7] and technological and economic differences [8] 69 
between the sectors did not make for positive synergies.  70 
 71 
Responding to the “problem of maturity” 72 
In the early 1990s, both sectors struggled as conventional chemical-based products 73 
reached maturity and R&D pipelines narrowed. By “maturity”, we mean molecules had 74 
already been developed for easy targets and were now off-patent, so no longer generating 75 
large profits, and industry was concerned about the long-term sustainability of 76 
conventional blockbuster R&D models.  Both sectors searched for new R&D options. In 77 
agriculture, strategic planning focused on ‘a combination of chemical and biotechnology 78 
developments with varying degrees of synergistic interaction’ [9,10]. Companies 79 
embraced diversity in technological development [11]. As product pipelines matured, 80 
three distinct company strategies emerged to exploit the new life science trajectory (Box 81 
1) 82 
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Innovation strategies are cumulatively dependent on a company’s past history 83 
[12,13], and the resources and ‘dynamic capabilities’ of a firm also influence its patterns 84 
of innovation [13]. The innovation strategies of agro-biotechnology companies in the 85 
1980s and 1990s varied, depending on their existing strengths in product development 86 
and technology trajectories along with their overall vision for the future.  GM crops were 87 
a disruptive technology for most multi-national agro-biotechnology companies still 88 
benefiting from patented agro-chemical products, but were attractive to firms that had 89 
reached the limits of small molecule chemical innovation and whose existing product 90 
range had reached a critical level of maturity.  91 
In pharmaceuticals, the maturity problem and the desire to move to high-value-92 
added biotechnology-based products was also a driver of organisational change and 93 
restructuring. Traditionally, pharmaceutical R&D was a serendipitous activity in which 94 
chemical compounds were randomly screened and tested on known disease targets. Lead 95 
molecules were then optimised by medicinal chemists to produce lead candidates for 96 
further development. In the 1980s and 1990s, advances in molecular biology, synthetic 97 
chemistry and screening technologies reshaped this R&D process [14] and created 98 
economies of scale and scope [15]. The emergence of potentially transformative life 99 
science technologies led to major industry restructuring, through internal reorganisation 100 
and merger, acquisition and strategic alliance activity [2,16,17]. (Box 1). Firms now 101 
coordinate an increasingly diverse range of R&D capabilities alongside the “normal” 102 
processes of organic growth [18]. However, despite the promises and strategic visions 103 
presented by the life sciences, various factors challenge large firms’ dominance in 104 
therapeutic innovation (Box 2).  105 
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Together, these challenges, amongst others [24], continue to shape the evolution 106 
of the pharmaceutical sector and strategic management of R&D within individual firms, 107 
with new R&D models and product development strategies emerging. For example, GSK 108 
developed Centers of Excellence for Drug Discovery in 2000, leading to its current 109 
decentralised R&D Hub structure [25,14], and most multinationals exploit public-private 110 
partnerships in both research and development. A good example of this is Pfizer’s current 111 
investment in Scotland’s Translational Medicine Research Collaboration (TMRC), which 112 
is focused on the identification and validation of novel biomarkers for drug development.  113 
Both the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology industries have been forced to 114 
confront the challenges and opportunities of the molecular life science paradigm in the 115 
context of maturity and drying-up of conventional product pipelines. For the 116 
pharmaceutical industry, life science investment and attendant organisational 117 
restructuring has been primarily a response to the challenges of therapeutic innovation, 118 
rather than a revolutionary, pro-active attempt to fully embrace a life science-based 119 
innovation trajectory. Innovation spending in agro-biotechnology has moved towards GM 120 
seed technology, with total agro-biotechnology R&D expected to equal agrochemicals in 121 
2009 [26]. 122 
Our research on both the agricultural and pharmaceutical industries has shown 123 
that multi-nationals do not always share common objectives and strategies; rather, 124 
strategy is an evolutionary process based on firms’ unique histories, internal 125 
competencies and routines, market position and future expectation [2,9,14] The long-lead 126 
times in pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology R&D mean that the precise benefits of 127 
any restructuring initiative and implantation of new strategy take time to emerge.  128 
 8 
Nevertheless, product innovation and company strategy is also determined by the 129 
regulatory environment and it is to this important aspect that we now turn.  130 
 131 
Regulation and its impact on innovation strategy and product development 132 
Regulation has perhaps the most significant impact on R&D-driven industries, such as 133 
pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology, and partly explains the long product lead times 134 
that distinguish these industries from most others, although even without formal 135 
regulation firms would still need to invest time and resource to establishing product 136 
safety. Nevertheless, changes in standards for safety and efficacy do have time/cost 137 
implications for industry [27].  The most significant and damaging effect of regulation in 138 
agro-biotechnology has been to increase costs, over conventional non GM varieties, by 139 
approximately 0.5 to 13.5 million USD [28].  We argue that regulation is the dominant 140 
shaper of both the innovation system and markets for innovative products in 141 
pharmaceuticals and agro-biotechnology. Specifically, it can constrain life science 142 
innovations through the complex, expensive and lengthy requirements imposed on 143 
developers of new drugs or pesticides. It has been recently suggested that clinical trials 144 
required by European regulators to compare biosimilar products with corresponding 145 
biologic brands are unnecessary and may impede the development of biosimilars of more 146 
complicated biologics [31]. Although this particular example is focused on biosimilars 147 
rather than novel biologics, it does highlight how regulation impacts on innovation.  The 148 
nature of the regulatory system for any given product can dictate the type of firms able to 149 
develop such products [4]. 150 
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To highlight the role and influence of regulation on both sectors, we look briefly 151 
at the regulation of two “disruptive technologies”; namely, GM crops in the agro-152 
biotechnology sector and stem cells/regenerative medicine in the pharmaceutical sector. 153 
Specifically, the systemic interactions of regulation and innovation for these two sectors 154 
and technology platforms are highlighted. Box 3 provides a background summary of the 155 
specificity of life science regulation.  156 
 157 
Path-breaking Versus Path-Dependent Products and Regulation 158 
Scientific knowledge and technological advances in biotechnology have led to radically 159 
new path-breaking products in health and agriculture, including GM crops and stem-cell-160 
based therapies. In both cases, regulation was considered crucial, but with no precedent 161 
for establishing a robust governance framework. In cases of new technologies, one can 162 
either look for existing regulatory regimes within which to place new product ranges, or 163 
design new path-breaking regulatory frameworks to meet the specific properties of the 164 
new technology. Based on our research on innovation and governance in life sciences 165 
[28-30], we consider it important to question the relationship between the emergence of 166 
path-breaking innovations and the putative need for path-breaking regulatory systems. 167 
 168 
Path-breaking innovations do not always require novel regulatory mechanisms.  169 
GM crops were a path-breaking technology, and the agro-biotechnology industry 170 
expected that they would be disruptive and move the sector onto a new high value-added 171 
innovation model, but it was not clear for quite some time after companies had invested 172 
heavily in their development what the nature of the regulatory regime would be. While 173 
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companies can cope with radical changes to their innovation systems, when these 174 
challenges are coupled with uncertainty in markets and regulatory regimes that are 175 
outwith their control, disruption to the entire sector can be magnified [4]. 176 
  Innovation that is “path-breaking” for one company or sector may of course be 177 
“path-dependent” for another. For example, it was not inevitable that GM crops would be 178 
developed and marketed only by the agro-biotechnology industry, for which they were 179 
clearly path-breaking; GM crops disrupted the prevailing innovation model, 180 
simultaneously impacting company R&D strategy (i.e. requiring a shift from chemistry- 181 
to biology-based development and production systems), markets (i.e. seed markets are 182 
very different from pesticide markets), and regulatory systems.   In the 1980s and early 183 
1990s, it was equally likely that food and seed companies would develop the technology. 184 
For these companies, the technology was path-dependent [4,30].  185 
A complex set of interactions between policymakers at European, U.S. and 186 
international levels, as well as among the agro-biotechnology, food production and 187 
distribution, and seed industry sectors, contributed to the overall framing of GM. It would 188 
have been beneficial to operationalise a rule that guided policymakers to adopt the 189 
regulatory system that applied to the industry sector for which the technology was path-190 
dependent; in this case the seed companies. The regulation of GM crop varieties would 191 
have been a lot easier (perhaps regulated under plant breeders’ rights) if the key initial 192 
developers had been the seed firms. This path-dependent regulatory approach may have 193 
made a significant difference to the direction of innovation in GM crops today and also to 194 
the public perception of the technology in Europe.  195 
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This analysis may also apply to the pharmaceutical sector in the case of stem cells 196 
and regenerative medicine. Stem cells, like GM crops, are potentially highly disruptive of 197 
prevailing pharmaceutical R&D systems, markets and regulatory systems. They require 198 
modification of company R&D strategies, moving from small-molecule innovation to 199 
complex biologics, and markets, which are very different to conventional blockbuster 200 
drug markets (they have much smaller patent populations and delivery of the product to 201 
the patient can be far more complex and expensive). The nature of the regulatory 202 
requirements will also determine whether such products are developed by conventional 203 
multi-national drug companies or the smaller tissue engineering firms. In parallel with the 204 
example of GM crops, stem cells would be path-breaking for pharmaceutical 205 
multinationals, but path-dependent for smaller tissue engineering companies. Comparison 206 
with GM crops would suggest that if regulation of stem cells could be framed so as to be 207 
path-dependent for the smaller companies, we might see faster and more innovative 208 
development and uptake of novel therapies. However, if the regulatory framework 209 
continues to align more closely with the sector to which the technology is path-breaking 210 
(in this case multinational pharmaceutical firms), which appears to be the case with the 211 
Advanced Therapies Regulation in Europe 212 
[http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:324:0121:0137:en:P213 
DF], we could see delays in the development of therapies and few small, innovative 214 
companies independently developing stem cell products. Whilst it is of course essential 215 
that stem cells and regenerative medicine products meet the key requirements of safety 216 
and efficacy, the question is whether the conventional regulations that apply to small 217 
molecule blockbuster products, and more conventional biologics, are appropriate for stem 218 
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cells; especially when they may be a barrier to innovation. Whilst there are certainly 219 
many myths and uncertainties about the regulatory gaps and barriers to regenerative 220 
medicine [32], there is yet no clear route to market for many of the small companies 221 
developing the technology and regulatory guidelines can be vague and ambiguous. 222 
Lessons from the regulation of GM crops may help us to develop regulatory processes for 223 
stem cells that encourage, rather than impede, those companies best placed to innovate in 224 
this area.  225 
 226 
Conclusion: key lessons for new “smart” approaches to regulation  227 
Regulatory systems tend to evolve incrementally over long time periods, which make 228 
them susceptible to becoming inflexible and out-of-step with the latest innovations and 229 
technologies. Furthermore, because regulation builds up in this way, it can become so 230 
complex that modifications to one set of regulations have unforeseen consequences for 231 
other parts of the regulatory system and for the innovation community. However, de novo 232 
creation of path-breaking regulation for path-breaking technology also poses difficulties 233 
and challenges and could just as easily discourage innovation as encourage it.  234 
From our extensive research that has explored innovation and regulation interactions 235 
in the pharmaceutical and agro-biotechnology sectors [2-6; 9, 10, 14, 30] we consider 236 
there to be a number of key lessons for better governance of innovative life science 237 
technologies, such as GM crops and stem cells [Box 4]. 238 
 239 
The life sciences continue to be of high strategic importance to both developed and 240 
emerging economies and shape many innovative industries. But life science innovation is 241 
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largely dominated by a relatively small number of multinational companies, and 242 
regulatory systems often serve to maintain the status quo. Regulation is an 243 
insurmountable barrier to many small start-up companies with innovative ideas that 244 
challenge prevailing orthodoxy. Whilst it would of course be inappropriate to lower 245 
safety and efficacy standards for life science-based products, the development of a 246 
smarter approach to regulation, which we have outlined, could bring about a more 247 
favourable climate for innovation.    248 
 249 
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Box 1. Agro-biotechnology company strategies 365 
Distinct strategies were employed by leading agro-biotechnology companies.  These 366 
strategies were conceived in response to external pressures, including low farm 367 
commodity prices and income; erosion of profit margins; more aggressive competition as 368 
a result of agribusiness restructuring; and the emergence of new technologies, such as 369 
genetic modification and molecular marker technologies, which challenged conventional 370 
farming practice. The narrowing of conventional chemical pipelines also drove this need 371 
for a new strategic vision. Companies employed these different strategies to respond to 372 
maturity and pressures in the innovation environment. 373 
 374 
“Buying the route to market” 375 
Monsanto and Dupont both invested heavily in building the GM technology base for the 376 
world’s major commodity markets: corn, soya and cotton. Moving from selling 377 
agrochemicals to selling seeds required a new marketing strategy, and both companies 378 
invested large sums in acquiring seed companies.  379 
 380 
 “Collaboration along the route to market” 381 
AgrEvo, Zeneca, Novartis, Rhone Poulenc and Dow also invested significantly in 382 
building a GM technology base, but they focused more on collaboration with seed 383 
companies rather than on outright purchases. This was a more incremental strategy.  384 
 385 
“Jumping on the bandwagon” 386 
 17 
BASF and Bayer were intentionally several years behind other agro-biotechnology 387 
companies in investing in GM technology, preferring to wait and to benefit from the 388 
experience of other companies. 389 
390 
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Box 2. Key challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry (1990s – present day) 391 
1. Decline in R&D productivity despite increases in R&D investment. The problem of 392 
product maturity coupled with a productivity crisis led to a perception of an “innovation 393 
deficit” that continues today[19]. Since 1996, the number of small molecule chemicals 394 
approved by regulators has been in decline and the number of new active compounds 395 
discovered has remained relatively constant. Companies are simply not generating 396 
enough new compounds in-house for sustainable growth [20]. 397 
 398 
2. High attrition rate of compounds, particularly during Phase II clinical trials. Lack of 399 
demonstrable safety and efficacy has been the principal cause of attrition, which is partly 400 
why companies now experiment with new “translational sciences” [21,22], particularly 401 
those centred on the identification and validation of novel biomarkers.   402 
 403 
3. Rising overall costs of drug discovery owing to the need for new, experimental 404 
methodological approaches to drug discovery and development, the increasing 405 
internationalisation of research and its competitive environment, and increasing demands 406 
of regulators and healthcare providers. In 2007, the cost for a large pharmaceutical firm 407 
to bring one product to market was estimated to be $800 million USD [23].  408 
 409 
4. Some early biotechnology firms were successful in transforming themselves into 410 
large multinationals (Amgen, Genzyme, Genentech and Geron, for example); but later 411 
growth in biotechnology has been slow, and the chances of a small, innovative 412 
biotechnology firm becoming a large, independent company today now appears bleak 413 
given the high regulatory barriers to entry. 414 
 19 
 415 
5. There has been some, small increases in partnerships between public and private 416 
institutes to pool information and attempt delivery of niche products, including orphan 417 
products and products for developing countries, such as vaccines. Nevertheless, the 418 
dominant model continues to rely on “blockbuster drugs” rather than targeted drugs for 419 
niche markets. Large firms have always needed to target three or four key blockbuster 420 
markets to remain competitive and sustain revenue growth. Despite the life science 421 
promise of radically new therapies for smaller populations (such as stem cell treatments 422 
and personalised medicines), multinational pharmaceutical firms did not seek to 423 
completely transform themselves into biotechnology companies; this is in contrast to 424 
some of the agro-biotechnology companies like Monsanto. Indeed, there has not yet been 425 
a pharmaceutical equivalent to Monsanto. 426 
427 
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Box 3: The nature of regulation in the life sciences 428 
Whilst it is obvious that regulation impacts product development, we suggest that the 429 
impact of regulation is much more far reaching than just ensuring goods are safe, 430 
effective and high-quality – [28]. It determines overall company strategy, the types of 431 
firm that will succeed in bringing products to market, and the structural dynamics of the 432 
sector as a whole. For example, if we compare the lightly regulated Information and 433 
Communication Technologies ICT sector with the heavily regulated life sciences, the 434 
former has a much greater turnover of products and capabilities arising from 435 
technological innovation. In ICT, small start-up companies can quickly become major 436 
players by developing innovations that challenge the status quo. Most candidates for 437 
product development in the health and agricultural sectors will fail (only one out of 438 
approximately 200,000 molecules initially screened will make it to product launch); 439 
therefore, innovation in life sciences appears far more linear than industries such as ICT 440 
[29]. Life science innovation is dominated by a small group of multinationals, which we 441 
argue is partly due to the fact that the regulatory system poses an insurmountable barrier 442 
for many new entrants with innovations that threaten to disrupt the status quo.   443 
The markets for life science products are also different from most other industries, 444 
inasmuch as few are marketed directly to consumers. Pesticides and GM crops are sold to 445 
farmers, and new medicinal products are mainly sold to health services [10]. The unique 446 
combination of regulation and markets for life sciences has therefore had major impacts 447 
on the structural dynamics and strategic management of both the pharmaceutical and 448 
agro-biotechnology sectors. 449 
 450 
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 451 
Box 4 : Key lessons for good governance of the life sciences 452 
(1) Regulatory initiatives can have significant, rapid and positive influences on the 453 
innovation system. Such insights on successes should be used as exemplars when 454 
designing or re-designing regulatory systems for new innovations.  455 
(2) Regulations that may be appropriate for one policy area can have unexpected 456 
and/or negative impacts when applied to other areas. Use of blockbuster drug 457 
clinical trials systems when applied to stem cells could be a major constraint, with 458 
adaptations to mechanisms such as the ‘hospital exemption route’ for the 459 
development of therapies for named patients perhaps a better way to encourage 460 
innovation in this sector. This problem is more likely and significant if regulators 461 
are not sufficiently aware of the potentially useful, but also vulnerable, new 462 
science, products and processes in development. 463 
(3) A regulatory policy that is enabling in that it encourages positive change in 464 
industry strategies and appropriately discriminates among products on the basis of 465 
socially and economically relevant criteria, will generally be more effective and 466 
efficient than a policy that is indiscriminate and seeks to constrain what it 467 
considered undesirable behaviour.  468 
(4) The enabling criterion affects the rapidity with which a particular regulatory 469 
policy can exert influence, while the range, scope and appropriateness of its 470 
discrimination among products and processes will determine its effectiveness in 471 
guiding product development in desired directions.  472 
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(5) Path-breaking regulation for path-breaking technology should not be the norm; 473 
rather, it should be the last resort once all other options have been exhausted. 474 
Other options might include, for example, a focus on ‘substantial equivalence’. If 475 
the new technology or product is substantially equivalent to an existing product, 476 
path-breaking regulation should not be necessary. Existing regulatory frameworks 477 
ought to be sufficient.  478 
(6) Finally, in considering which regulatory precedent is most appropriate for a new 479 
innovative technology, a useful approach would be to first consider the regulatory 480 
system in operation for the industry sector for which the innovation is path-481 
dependent, rather than for the one for which it is path-breaking. This would 482 
ensure the sector better positioned to quickly take forward the product to market 483 
is encouraged to do so.  484 
 485 
